Re: On {lo} and existence

[ucleaar <ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk>]

Jorge:
> > > > The process is analogous to deciding whether {le nanmu cu ninmu}
> > > > is true. First the hearer must ascertain who {le nanmu} refers to.
> > > Exactly. What you suggest in practice is that {lo} is nonspecific
> > > nonveridical. I think that goes against the canon.
> > I don't see why it's nonveridical. On the contrary: {lo broda} makes
> > an implicit claim that the referent really is a broda, rather than
> > merely being described as such.
> It comes to the same thing. "Being described as a broda" is the same
> as "really is a broda in the universe of my description". Everything
> "really is a broda" in some universe, so allowing {lo broda} to refer
> to brodas of any universe is tantamount to letting it be nonveridical.

For absolutely the last time I'll defend the {lo}-is-not-equivalent-to-
{da poi} view.

If S is a sentence containing {lo broda}, and D is the set of propositions
derivable from S (by grammatical rules), then it is always possible
to find in D a proposition that is true in this world, and a proposition
that is false in this world. The same goes for sentences containing
{le broda}.

However, even if many propositions can be derived from a given sentence,
when we utter it there is a guarantee that all but one of these
propositions is to be rejected. Consider {le cukta cu blanu}. From
this we can derive an infinitude of propositions, differentiated
by which individual(s) {le cukta} denotes. But if I utter that
sentence you know that all but one of those propositions has been
discarded; this is because the denotation of {le cukta} gets fixed.
Exactly the same applies to {mi terxra lo cukta}, where {lo cukta}
adds "in universe U x is a book". From this too we can derive an
infinitude of propositions, differentiated by which universe universe U
is. And similarly, if I utter that sentence you know that all but one
of those propositions has been discarded; this is because the identity
of U gets fixed. And, like every proposition, this undiscarded one
must be either true or false.

Now, consider {mi terxra lo -balrog}. Now that sentence, abstracted
from any context, can mean "I drew a tulip", and to that extent it
is nonveridical. But turn this sentence into an utterance, and it
is associated with exactly one proposition. So let's pick a certain
utterance of that sentence: this utterance is associated with
the proposition:
  Ex in This World I drew x & in Middle Earth x is a balrog
I maintain [without necessarily believing] that that can't mean
"I drew a tulip", in the sense that there is a tulip that the picture
resembles. Now contrast that with something genuinely nonveridical:
{le gerku cu xekri} can truthfully be said of a tulip.

> I prefer to avoid the introduction of unnecessary entities, and
> instead of saying "in U x is my wings", I can say "in R x is
> my imaginary wings", which is not {lo mi nalci}.
> I prefer to see imaginary things as imaginary things of this universe,
> rather than as real things of other universes. The concept of "other
> universes" is totally unnecessary for our semantic theory.
> (The concept of "imaginary" is already a predicate, I don't see
> the need to make it a metapredicate.)

How would that work? The set of imaginary wings is not formed from
the intersection of the set of wings and the set of imaginaries.

Or would you take the view that the set of wings includes imaginary
wings, but when we speak of {lo nalci} there is a presumption that
we are quantifying not over the set of wings but over the intersection
of the set of wings and the set of reals?

> > > > > You can't say "I don't have wings, but they are very pretty".
> > > > That's right. It's only certain things like describees that don't
> > > > have to exist in the same universe as the universe in which the
> > > > main predication obtains.
> > > I think that's sumti raising in disguise.
> > You may be right. How would you unraise draw-a-pic-of?
> You have to explain the predicate better. "Take a photograph of" is
> clearly not a problem, the object is a real object. For drawing
> a picture, the case is the same if the x2 is the model. If the
> model x2 is not a really-is broda but a generic or somesuch, then
> don't use {lo}.

The x2 of the predicate I had in mind is not the model but the
"subject-matter".

> > > For every <bridi>, {da poi nu <bridi>} is defined as a potential event.
> > > A potential event can happen, in which case it is an actual event,
> > > or never happen, in which case it remains a potential event only.
> > > (I don't like to define {nu} this way, I'm just trying to justify
> > > it's use for irrealis events).
> > How do I ascertain whether something is a potential event if it is of
> > the never-happening variety?
> _Every_ {nu <bridi>} would be a potential event. There's nothing to ascertain.
> It's just a definition. All I'm saying is that {lo'i nu <bridi>} is not
> the empty set for any <bridi>. What you call {nu <bridi>}, be it "potential
> event" or something else is not important.

I see no difference between your definition of {nu} and my observation
that {lo nu} defaults to {lo dahi nu}. Maybe you see no difference
either.

> I would prefer that {nu <bridi>} be an actual event, but allowing it
> to always have a referent that satisfies it should not commit us to
> do the same for every broda.
> > What you call an extension of an inconvience, I call transforming
> > inconsistency into consistency.
> Yes, but what you throw away in the process is too much for my taste.

That's fine. I am concerned only to lay out the coherent options,
any of which are okay with me.

> > Or we can let the inconsitency stand, with {nu} by default exceptionally
> > being {dahi nu}, and all other selbri defaulting to {dahinai broda}.
> Why by exception? Is {xanri} by exception a {da'i broda}?

No, it's not. You can test whether something is xanri by looking inside
someone's head and then looking outside their head. If there's something
inside that's not matched by anything outside, then it's {dahinai xanri}.
I also think {lo crida} is {lo dahinai crida}, except you check a
different world, or this one if {lo crida} exists in this world.

> It's just a different definition of {nu}, not an exception to anything.

It's exceptional because it's not verifiable. All other selbri can
be verified/falsified by inspecting the world. Put another way:
however you restrict the category, it always remains non-empty.

({lohi nu broda gihe na broda} would fairly clearly be non-empty,
but lo dahi god knows whether {lohi nu broda kei gihe na nu broda}
is non-empty.)

> > Any of these three is okay by me.
> My first choice would be that {nu broda} be a real event of brodaing.
> I can accept it being a potential event of brodaing, but I'd hate to
> let {lo broda} be anything other than a this-world broda.
> ("This world" being the world in which the discourse takes place.)

I think that of those who've expressed a view, only Lojbab doesn't
go along with your first or second choice, though of the remainder
I don't know whether it is your first or your second choice that
they prefer. John & pc said they agree with you, but the status
of {nu} wasn't mentioned.

---
And